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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Case No. 950277-CA 
v. : 
BRET RAY ARBON, : 
Priority No. 10 
and : 
KIMBERLY SUE MILLIGAN, : 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendants appeal from interlocutory orders denying 
their motions to dismiss their criminal prosecutions on double 
jeopardy grounds. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the cases 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Does the administrative revocation of a driver's 
license constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes? 
The trial court's determination that an administrative 
driver's license revocation does not amount to a criminal 
punishment under the Double Jeopardy Clause is a conclusion of 
law that is reviewed for correctness. Cf. United States v. 
Rogers, 960 F.2d 1501, 1506 (10th Cir. 1992) ("We review de novo 
the legal conclusions made by the district court regarding double 
jeopardy claims."). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U. S. Const. Amend. V: 
No person shall be held to answer for a 
capitol, or otherwise infamous crime, unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor 
shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation. 
The text of any other pertinent provisions, statutes or 
rules is incorporated in the argument section of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were arrested for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol and had their driver's licenses revoked 
administratively (Record of State v. Arbon at 4, 20 [hereinafter 
"Rl."]; record of State v. Milliaan at 3, 15 [hereinafter 
"R2."]). Upon being charged in criminal court with driving while 
under the influence of alcohol, defendants filed motions to 
dismiss their prosecution on double jeopardy grounds (Rl. at 19-
29; R2. at 15-25). Specifically, defendants claimed that the 
administrative revocation of their driving privileges constituted 
a punishment and that a criminal prosecution for DUI would 
subject them to a second punishment for the same offense (id.). 
The trial court denied defendants' motions without comment (Rl. 
53-54; R2. 48-49). (Copies of the trial court's orders are 
attached hereto as addendum A.) 
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Defendants petitioned this Court for permission to 
appeal from the trial court's interlocutory orders, and the State 
recommended that the petitions be granted (Rl. at 126). This 
Court granted defendants' petitions and ordered the cases 
consolidated on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts underlying the charges against defendants are 
not apparent from the records on appeal. However, because the 
issue raised on appeal is purely a matter of law that is not 
fact-dependant, the procedural facts articulated in the Statement 
of the Case are sufficient to allow this Court to dispose of 
defendants' appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendants' prosecutions for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol are not barred by double jeopardy simply 
because their driver's licenses were suspended in earlier 
administrative proceedings. The purpose of suspending the 
driver's license of someone who has driven while under the 
influence of alcohol is "to protect the public, not to punish 
individuals drivers." Ballard v. State Motor Vehicle Division, 
595 P.2d 1302, 1305 (Utah 1979). Because suspending the driving 
privileges of an intoxicated driver advances the nonpunitive goal 
of protecting the public from a hazardous driver, an 
administrative license suspension does not constitute a "criminal 
punishment" under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth 
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Amendment, This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's 
denial of defendants' motions to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
This case presents an issue of first impression in 
Utah. Although another case involving a double jeopardy claim in 
the context of asset forfeiture proceedings is now pending before 
this Court, see State v. Davis, Case No. 940574-CA, this case 
implicates another body of case law not involved in the area of 
asset forfeiture. Accordingly, in order to put the issue raised 
in its proper historical context, the State has provided a more 
extensive discussion of double jeopardy jurisprudence than it 
would normally include in a brief to this Court. 
POINT I 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
JURISPRUDENCE PROM PEARCE TO KURTH RANCH 
The Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause provides 
as follows: " . . . nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life and limb . . .." 
U.S. Const. Amend. V. Over a century ago, the United States 
Supreme Court observed that " [i]f there is anything settled in 
the jurisprudence of England and America, it is that no man can 
be twice lawfully punished for the same offence." Ex parte 
Lanae. 18 Wall. 163, 168 (1874). The Court has therefore 
interpreted the provision to extend three distinct protections to 
criminal defendants: 
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a 
second prosecution for the same offense after 
acquittal. It protects against a second 
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prosecution for the same offense after 
conviction. And it protects against multiple 
punishments for the same offense. 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 
(1969) . 
In this case, only the third prong of Pearce. the 
prohibition against multiple punishments for the same offense, is 
at issue. Specifically, defendants allege that they were 
punished by the State when the State administratively revoked 
their driving privileges for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. Accordingly, defendants claim that the State cannot 
seek to punish them a second time and that the State is therefore 
barred from prosecuting them in criminal court for driving under 
the influence of alcohol. In making their argument, defendants 
rely primarily on three cases: United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 
435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989); Department of Revenue of Montana v. 
Kurth Ranch, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); and Austin v. 
United States, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). As 
demonstrated below, defendants have read far too much into Halper 
and Kurth Ranch, and their reliance on Austin is wholly misplaced 
because that case arises under the Eighth Amendment Excessive 
Fines Clause rather than the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy 
Clause at issue here. 
A. The Supreme Court Has Nearly Always Held 
that Civil Sanctions are Not Punishment 
for Double Jeopardy Purposes. 
Although multiple criminal prosecutions and multiple 
criminal punishments for the same offense are impermissible, the 
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Supreme Court has held that "Congress may impose both a criminal 
and a civil sanction in respect to the same act or omission." 
United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 
359, 104 S. Ct. 1099, 1103 (1984) (quoting Helverina v. Mitchell, 
303 U.S. 391, 399, 58 S. Ct. 630, 633 (1938)). Where both the 
civil and criminal sanctions are imposed in the same proceeding, 
there is no double jeopardy violation. Halper, 490 U.S. at 450. 
Where there are two separate proceedings and one is criminal 
while the other is civil, there may be a double jeopardy 
violation based on Pearce's prohibition against multiple 
punishments if the defendant can demonstrate that the civil 
sanction was exacted solely as a punishment. Halper, 490 U.S. at 
448-49. The standard for establishing that a civil sanction 
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes is, however, 
very demanding. 
Historically, the Supreme Court found that sanctions 
arising from civil actions held after completion of a criminal 
prosecution did not violate the double jeopardy clause.1 See, 
e.g., 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 366 (civil forfeiture obtained 
after acquittal on charge of illegal sale of firearms without a 
1
 The sequential order of the criminal and civil proceedings 
does not impact the analysis of whether a defendant has been 
subjected to "multiple punishments" for the same offense. See, 
e.g., United States v. Tillev. 18 F.3d 295, 298 n.5 (5th Cir.) 
("Regardless of the order of the civil and criminal proceedings, 
the Double Jeopardy Clause will ban the second sanction if both 
the first and the second sanction are deemed punishment." 
(citations omitted)), cert, denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 574 
(1994). Accord United States v. Mavers, 897 F.2d 1126, 1127, 
reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 907 F.2d 1145 (11th Cir.), cert. 
denied, U.S. , 111 S. Ct. 178 (1990). 
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license upheld against double jeopardy challenge); One Lot 
Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. United States, 409 U.S. 232, 
237, 93 S. Ct. 489, 493 (1972) (civil forfeiture after an 
acquittal on smuggling charge upheld); Rex Trailer Co. v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 148, 154, 76 S. Ct. 219, 222 (1956) (upholding 
civil damages suit filed after conviction of fraud). In short, 
the Supreme Court concluded that "the risk to which the [Double 
Jeopardy] Clause refers is not present in proceedings that are 
not 'essentially criminal [prosecutions].'" Breed v. Jones, 421 
U.S. 519, 528, 95 S. Ct. 1779, 1785 (1975). 
The 89 Firearms line of authority applied a two-part 
test based primarily on principles of statutory construction to 
determine whether a particular civil penalty was so punitive as 
to be deemed criminal punishment: 
First we have set out to determine whether 
Congress, in establishing the penalizing 
mechanism, indicated either expressly or 
impliedly, a preference for [a civil] label 
or [a criminal label]. Second, where 
Congress has indicated an intention to 
establish a civil penalty, we have inquired 
further whether the statutory scheme was so 
punitive either in purpose or effect as to 
negate that intention. 
89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 362-63 (quoting United States v. Ward, 
448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641 (1980) (internal 
citations omitted)). 
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In United States v. Halper2, the Court clarified the 
significance of its earlier double jeopardy cases: 
The relevant teaching of [such cases as 
Helverincr. Hess, Rex Trailer and Emerald Cut 
Stones! is that the Government is entitled to 
rough remedial justice, that is, it may 
demand compensation according to somewhat 
imprecise formulas, such as reasonable 
liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double 
damages, without being deemed to have imposed 
a second punishment for the purpose of double 
jeopardy analysis. These cases do not tell 
us, because the problem was not presented in 
them, what the Constitution commands when one 
of those imprecise formulas authorizes a 
supposedly remedial sanction that does not 
remotely approximate the Government's damages 
and actual costs, and rough justice becomes 
clear injustice. 
Haloer, 490 U.S. at 446. 
The Halper Court then indicated that "the [statutory] 
labels 'criminal' and 'civil' are not of paramount importance." 
Id. at 447. Rather, because the double jeopardy protection 
against multiple punishments for the same offense is 
"intrinsically personal [, its] violation can be identified only 
by assessing the character of the actual sanctions imposed on the 
individual by the machinery of the state." Id. (footnote 
2
 In Halper, the defendant was the manager of a medical 
laboratory that provided services to Medicare patients. Halper 
submitted 65 falsified claims for reimbursement that resulted in 
his company being overpaid a total of $585. Halper was convicted 
of 65 violations of the false-claims act and was fined $5,000 and 
sentenced to two years of incarceration. Subsequently, the 
government was granted summary judgment against Halper in an 
action filed under the civil false-claims act, which mandated the 
assessment of a fixed penalty of $2,000 for each of the 65 false 
claims filed by Halper for a total of $130,000. 
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omitted). The Court explained: 
This is not to say that whether a sanction 
constitutes punishment must be made from the 
defendant's perspective. On the contrary, 
our cases have acknowledged that for the 
defendant even remedial sanctions carry the 
sting of punishment. Rather, we hold merely 
that in determining whether a particular 
civil sanction constitutes criminal 
punishment, it is the purpose actually served 
by the sanction in question, not the 
underlying nature of the proceeding giving 
rise to the sanction, that must be evaluated. 
Id. at 447 n.7. 
Against this backdrop, the Court articulated its test 
for determining whether a civil sanction constitutes criminal 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes and stated the holding of 
Halper as follows: 
We therefore hold that under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has 
been punished in a criminal prosecution may 
not be subjected to an additional civil 
sanction to the extent that the second 
sanction may not fairly be characterized as 
remedial, but only as a deterrent or 
retribution. 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49 (emphasis added). 
Despite the clarity of the Court's express holding, 
defendants argue that another sentence in the Halper opinion 
creates ambiguity about what test for determining whether a civil 
sanction constitutes punishment should be applied to their case. 
Br. of Appellants at 4-5. Instead of the test articulated in the 
Court's holding, defendants argue the following language is 
controlling: 
[A] civil sanction that cannot be said solely 
to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can 
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only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is 
punishment, as we have come to understand the 
term. 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 448. 
On their face, the above passages from the Halper 
opinion are difficult to reconcile. However, when viewed in the 
context of the Halper case itself, it is clear that the Court did 
not intend to hold that the existence of any incidental 
retributive or deterrent effect of an otherwise remedial measure 
will render that remedial measure punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. The Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated only in those 
rare instances where a purportedly remedial measure becomes so 
grossly disproportionate to the harm suffered by the government 
as a result of the defendant's conduct that it totally loses its 
remedial characteristics and becomes purely punitive. 
B. The Halper Court Made Clear That Its 
Holding Was Not Intended To Require 
Sweeping Changes In The Way Civil 
Sanctions Axe Viewed Under The Double 
Jeopardy Clause. 
The Halper Court emphasized the limited scope of its 
holding and said it was announcing a rule for the "rare case, the 
case . . . where a fixed-penalty provision subjects a prolific 
but small-gauge offender to a sanction overwhelmingly 
disproportionate to the damages he has caused." Id. at 449. 
The Halper rule "is one of reason" that should seldom result in 
civil sanctions being deemed punishment. Id. As the Halper 
Court concluded: "[T]he only proscription established by our 
ruling is that the Government may not criminally prosecute a 
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defendant, impose a criminal penalty upon him, and then bring a 
separate civil action based on the same conduct and receive a 
judgment that is not rationally related to the goal of making the 
Government whole." Id. at 451. 
Under Halper, courts must first decide whether the 
sanction sought "bears [a] rational relation to the goal of 
compensating the Government for its loss." Id. at 449. If so, 
then the sanction is proper and should not be deemed punishment 
for double jeopardy purposes. However, if a defendant 
demonstrates that the sanction "appears to qualify as 
'punishment' in the plain meaning of the word, then the defendant 
is entitled to an accounting of the Government's damages and 
costs to determine if the penalty sought in fact constitutes a 
second punishment." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). In 
providing that accounting, the Government need not be exacting 
but can instead use "imprecise formulas" to approximate its 
damages. Id. (emphasizing that its decision "cast no shadow on 
[its] time-honored judgments" in which it had accepted such 
imprecise formulas as liquidated damages for calculating remedial 
sanctions). Trial courts have "the discretion to determine on 
the basis of such an accounting the size of the civil sanction 
the Government may receive without crossing the line between 
remedy and punishment." Id. (citations omitted). 
Having explained its standard for determining whether a 
civil sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes, the Supreme Court noted its agreement "with the 
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District Court['s determination] that the disparity between its 
approximation of the Government's cost [($16,000)] and Halper's 
$130,000 liability [was] sufficiently disproportionate that the 
sanction constitutes a second punishment in violation of double 
jeopardy[.]" Halper 490 U.S. at 452. Nevertheless, the Court 
remanded the case so that the Government could have "an 
opportunity to present . . . an accounting of its actual costs 
arising from Halper's fraud, to seek an adjustment of the 
District Court's approximation, and to recover its demonstrated 
costs." Id. 
The Halper Court's decision to remand the case makes 
clear that civil sanctions having retributive or deterrent 
consequences in addition to their primarily remedial functions 
are not punishment per se for double jeopardy purposes. Rather, 
monetary remedies that appear punitive must be evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis to see if they are in fact punishment or are 
instead "rationally related to the goal of making the Government 
whole." Id. at 451 (footnote omitted). If the sanction bears a 
rational relationship to a nonpunitive government objective, or 
the government can demonstrate that the amount of the sanctions 
is roughly proportional to its damages based on an accounting of 
its damages, then any punitive characteristics that incidentally 
accompany the sanction will not result in the sanction being 
deemed a punishment for double jeopardy purposes. 
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C. The Supreme Court Recently Recognized 
the Continuing Vitality of the Halper 
Test for Determining Whether A Civil 
Sanction Constitutes Punishment For 
Double Jeopardy Purposes. 
In its most recent double jeopardy case, Dept. of 
Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1937, 
1948 (1994), the Court held that a purported "tax" that is "the 
functional equivalent of a successive criminal prosecution" may 
not follow a separate criminal punishment. In reviewing the 
Montana tax, the Court first noted that the legislative history 
of the tax demonstrated it was intended to deter drug use, Id. at 
1946, and that the tax rate was high, Id. at 1947. The Court 
made clear, however, that "while a high tax rate and deterrent 
purpose lend support to the characterization of the drug tax as 
punishment, these features, in and of themselves, d[id] not 
necessarily render the tax punitive." Id. (citation omitted). 
That notion squares with the Court's recognition in Halper that 
even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment, Halper, 
490 U.S. at 447 n.7. More importantly, it confirms that civil 
sanctions and taxes will not be deemed "punishment" for double 
jeopardy purposes simply because they are punitive in part. 
The Kurth Ranch majority explained why several other 
factors prompted it to conclude that the Montana tax was in fact 
not a tax but instead a punishment. Perhaps most telling was the 
Court's observation that liability under the unique Montana drug 
stamp tax at issue in Kurth Ranch was statutorily conditioned 
upon the commission of a crime. Id. at 1947. Indeed, liability 
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did not even arise unless the "taxpayer" was arrested. Id. 
Accordingly, arrestees "constitute[d] the entire class of 
taxpayers subject to the Montana tax." Id. Finally, the Court 
emphasized that the tax was levied on the taxed goods at a time 
when the "taxpayer" neither owned nor possessed the goods. Id. 
at 1948. Considering the totality of the above factors, the 
Court concluded that "[t]aken as a whole, [Montana's] drug tax 
[wa]s a concoction of anomalies, too far-removed in crucial 
respects from a standard tax assessment to escape 
characterization as punishment for purposes of Double Jeopardy 
analysis." Id. 
While not applying Halper per se, the Court in Kurth 
Ranch made clear that the Halper definition of "punishment" for 
double jeopardy purposes was still valid. For instance, the 
majority relied on Halper for the proposition that a civil 
sanction constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes if 
"'the sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but 
only as a deterrent or retribution.'" Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 
1945 (quoting Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49). Similarly, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist, writing in dissent, emphasized that the proper 
inquiry was whether the tax rate was "so high that it can only be 
explained as serving a punitive purpose." Id. at 1952. While 
the majority concluded that the Montana drug stamp tax 
proceedings were the "functional equivalent of a successive 
prosecution,lf Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "the Montana 
tax has a nonpenal purpose of raising revenue, as well as the 
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legitimate purpose of deterring conduct, such that it should be 
regarded as a genuine tax[, and not punishment,] for double 
jeopardy purposes." Id. Justice 0'Conner, likewise said that: 
"Our double jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will 
be considered punishment to the extent that serves only the 
purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering 
any nonpunitve objective." Id. at 1953 (citing Halper, 490 U.S. 
at 448-49). Finally, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, 
argued that the double jeopardy clause prohibits only multiple 
prosecutions, not multiple punishments. Accordingly, Justice 
Scalia advocated a return to the pre-Halper "civil" versus 
"criminal" proceeding distinction and urged that Halper be 
overruled. IsL at 1955-60. 
In sum, the Halper test for determining whether a civil 
sanction is remedial or punitive is not altered, but is indeed 
revitalized, under Kurth Ranch. The Court in both cases 
recognized that just because a non-criminal sanction is partly 
punitive does necessarily mean the sanction constitutes 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Accordingly, despite 
defendants' attempts to the contrary, Halper's demanding standard 
for deeming a civil sanction punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes should not be confused with the easily met definition of 
punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment that the Court announced in Austin v. United 
States. U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
15 
D. Halper'B Definition of Punishment for 
Fifth Amendment Purposes Is More 
Stringent Than Austin's Definition of 
Punishment for Eighth Amendment 
Purposes. 
Defendants essentially attempt an end-run around the 
express holding of Halper by claiming that under Austin anytime 
an otherwise remedial sanction is accompanied by an element of 
deterrence or retribution --no matter how slight that punitive 
element might be -- the sanction is deemed a punishment per se 
for both Eighth and Fifth Amendment purposes. Defendants' 
analysis of Halper in light of Austin -- though perhaps appealing 
because of its simplicity --is fundamentally flawed and ignores 
the more recent double jeopardy case of Kurth Ranch. 
The defendant in Austin was convicted of state drug 
charges. The United States then filed an in rem action seeking 
forfeiture of Austin's mobile home and body shop, based on his 
having retrieved two grams of cocaine from the mobile home and 
distributed them to an undercover agent at the body shop. 
Although Austin advanced no double jeopardy claim -- presumably 
because the two cases were brought by separate sovereigns --he 
did argue that the forfeiture violated the Excessive Fines Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment. Both the trial court and the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that claim and held the 
Excessive Fines Clause was inapplicable to civil in rem 
forfeitures. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that any sanction 
that is "at least in part, punishment" is subject to review under 
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the Excessive Fines Clause. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806. In so 
holding, the Court relied on dicta contained in Halper. 
Significantly, however, the Court did not indicate that its 
definition of punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes was 
applicable to double jeopardy claims. On the contrary, the 
Austin Court cited 89 Firearms and Emerald Cut Stones for the 
proposition that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply to 
civil forfeiture proceedings where the forfeiture could properly 
be characterized as remedial and implied that Halper's 
prohibition of a civil sanction following a criminal punishment 
would apply only if the civil sanction may not fairly be 
characterized as remedial. Austin, 114 S. Ct. at 2805 n.4. 
Austin's assertion that a civil forfeiture is subject 
to review under the Eighth Amendment if it is punitive "at least 
in part" cannot be squared with Halper's holding that a civil 
sanction is punishment for double jeopardy purposes only if it 
"the sanction may not be fairly characterized as remedial, but 
only as a deterrent or retribution." Moreover, while the Court 
in Halper recognized that defendant will feel the "sting of 
punishment" from even "remedial sanctions," Halper. 490 U.S. at 
447 n.7, the Austin Court extended no similar latitude in 
determining whether to subject an only partly punitive civil 
sanction to Eighth Amendment review. 
While making much of the fact that the Court in Austin 
borrowed dicta from Halper to articulate a definition of 
punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes, defendants fail to 
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recognize that the Court has never borrowed language from Austin 
to define "punishment" for Fifth Amendment purposes. Quite the 
contrary, in Kurth Ranch (the Court's only double jeopardy case 
to be decided after both Halper and Austin) the majority cited 
Austin only once. Even then, the Court merely cited Austin for 
the unremarkable proposition that a civil forfeiture may violate 
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive fines. 
Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. at 1945. Writing in dissent, Justice 
Scalia cited Austin in a similar fashion. Id. at 1958 n.2. 
If the Supreme Court really intended the Austin 
definition of punishment under the Excessive Fines Clause to be 
applicable in double jeopardy cases as defendants suggest, Austin 
would have figured more prominently in Kurth Ranch. Instead, as 
discussed above, the Court repeatedly used language similar that 
contained in its holding in Halper rather than the Halper dicta 
upon which Austin was based. 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals recently rejected 
attempts by two DUI defendants to rely on Austin as the basis for 
their double jeopardy claims for precisely the reasons advanced 
by the State above: 
The defendants in these appeals argue 
that civil sanction is "punishment" under 
Halper unless it can "fairly be said to 
solely serve a remedial purpose." But this 
statement is not the explicit holding of 
Halper. . . . Moreover, this "solely 
remedial" language is derived from a broader 
analysis of the civil-criminal distinction 
for purposes of due process. That analysis 
does not apply in determining whether a civil 
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sanction is "punishment." 
The defendants argue that the Supreme 
Court in Austin v. United States pointed to 
the "solely remedial" language as the holding 
of Halper. But Austin involves the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, not the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. In a more recent 
opinion that does involve double jeopardy, 
fKurth Ranch,1 the Court has referred to the 
explicit Halper holding . . . as the holding 
of that case. 
State v. Hanson, 532 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. App. 1995) (citations 
omitted). 
When viewed in context, the passage from Halper upon 
which defendants predicate their claim is out-of-sync with Halper 
itself as well as the remaining body of double jeopardy 
jurisprudence. Given that the Halper Court stated that its rule 
was one of "reason" that should result in civil monetary 
sanctions being deemed punishments in only "rare" case, 
defendants' expansive interpretation of Halper based on the 
Austin Eighth Amendment "excessive fines" standard is unfounded. 
Rather, as demonstrated below, numerous appellate courts have 
rejected double jeopardy claims similar to that advanced by 
defendants based on their determination that Halper was intended 
to be read very narrowly. Indeed, many have held that Halper and 
its progeny apply only to monetary sanctions and that non-
monetary sanctions, such a license revocations, are beyond the 
reach of the Halper test. 
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POINT II 
THE RULE ANNOUNCED IN HALPER APPLIES ONLY TO 
MONETARY CIVIL SANCTIONS AND WAS NEVER 
INTENDED TO INVALIDATE NON-MONETARY SANCTIONS 
THAT ADVANCE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES 
When examining double jeopardy claims involving non-
monetary sanctions, several courts have refused to apply Halper's 
"particularized assessment" test in favor of looking to Halper 
for only general guidance. See, e.g.. Loui v. Board of Medical 
Examiners, 889 P.2d 705, 711 (Hawaii 1995) (Halper test does not 
apply to question of whether suspension of physician's license 
following his conviction of sexual abuse and kidnapping 
constituted a second punishment but looking "more broadly at the 
principles enunciated in Halper" to reject double jeopardy 
claim); Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 
1992) (Halper inapplicable to physician's claim that five year 
suspension from participation in Medicare programs constituted a 
punishment because it did not involve the assessment of a 
monetary sanction and finding suspension was remedial measure to 
protect program); United States v. Reed. 937 F.2d 575, 577 (11th 
Cir. 1991) ("Halper test simply does not apply" to issue of 
whether 30-day disciplinary suspension of letter carrier 
constituted a punishment that would bar subsequent prosecution 
for conduct underlying suspension but Halper was nonetheless 
helpful for "framing [the court's] analysis"); Greene v. 
Sullivan, 731 F.Supp. 838, 840 (E.D.Tenn. 1990) (Halper 
inapplicable because the government was not seeking any monetary 
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recovery from defendant but only seeking to bar him from 
participating in Medicaid programs). 
Similarly, Halper is not directly applicable to the 
question of whether an administrative license revocation 
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes. Because 
revoking a person's driver's license in no way compensates the 
government for the damage caused by the inebriated driver, some 
courts have looked beyond the narrow holding of Halper to resolve 
double jeopardy claims similar to those advanced by defendants. 
See, e.g.. State v. Hicra. 897 P.2d 928, 933 (Hawaii 1995) 
(holding Halper test inapplicable because driver's license 
suspension did compensate government for monetary loss, but 
applying "broader principles enunciated in Halper" to find 
license suspension was a remedial measure designed to protect the 
public from unsafe drivers). Accord Ellis v. Pierce, 282 
Cal.Rprt. 93, 95 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1991); Freeman v. State, 611 
So.2d 1260, 1261 (Fla. App. 2 Dist. 1992) (per curiam). 
Other courts have emphasized that permission to drive 
on the public roads is a privilege voluntarily granted by the 
government and that revocation of a driver's license is therefore 
not a punishment. Johnson v. State. 622 A.2d 199, 205 (Md. App. 
1993). Cf^ Helverina v. Mitchell. 303 U.S. 391, 398, S. Ct. 
, (1938) (revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted 
"is characteristically free of the punitive criminal element" 
necessary to deem such action a punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes). 
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In keeping with the cases cited, this Court should 
reject defendants' double jeopardy claims on the ground that the 
privilege of having a driver's license is one that is voluntarily 
granted by the State and that revocation of that privilege in the 
interest of public safety is therefore a remedial measure. The 
mere fact that defendants may incidentally be inconvenienced by 
that action, or even feel the "sting of punishment," does not 
mean that they have been subjected to a criminal punishment as 
envisioned by the Supreme Court in Halper. Such suspensions are 
reasonable measures designed to protect the public safety by 
quickly removing dangerous drivers from the public highways. 
Indeed, everything about the driver's license scheme is aimed at 
ensuring that only those people who can safely drive a vehicle 
are permitted to carry a driver's license.3 
POINT III 
EVEN APPLYING A HALPER ANALYSIS, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSION OR REVOCATION OF A 
DRIVER'S LICENSE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
PUNISHMENT FOR DOUBLE JEOPARDY PURPOSES 
The United States Supreme Court's double jeopardy cases 
dealing with the question of whether civil sanctions constitute 
3
 For instance, Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-206 (1994) requires 
that the driver's license division test each applicant's: 
1) eyesight, 2) ability to read and understand highway signs, 
3) physical and mental abilities and 4) ability to exercise 
ordinary and responsible control driving a motor vehicle- Under 
Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-208 (1994), the division may impose safety 
restrictions on a licensee (i.e., requiring a licensee with 
vision problems to wear eyeglasses while driving). Revoking a 
license of someone who has engaged in such hazardous driving 
behavior as driving while under the influence of alcohol is but 
another reasonable means of protecting the public from unsafe 
drivers. 
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criminal punishment, including Halper and Kurth Ranch, all share 
a common theme. Civil sanctions and taxes will not be deemed 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes unless "the clearest 
proof" demonstrates that they have lost their remedial or 
revenue-generating characteristics and become solely punitive in 
"purpose and effect." 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. at 365. Similarly, 
an administrative license revocation should not be considered 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes unless the clearest proof 
demonstrates that administrative license revocations have lost 
their safety regulating characteristics and become solely 
punitive in both purpose and effect. As demonstrated below, 
numerous courts have relied on Halper to determine that the non-
monetary sanction of revoking or suspending a person's driving 
privileges does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. 
A. Under Halper, A Civil Sanction May 
Carry The "Sting of Punishment" 
Without Being Deemed A Criminal 
Punishment For Double Jeopardy 
Purposes. 
Even if license revocations were construed as a "civil 
remedy" within the meaning of Halper, it is clear that revoking 
the driving privileges of people who have revealed their 
propensity to drive while under the influence of alcohol is a 
remedial measure intended to protect the public from hazardous 
drivers. 
In 1983, the Utah Legislature revamped Utah's DUI and 
license suspension laws. In so doing, the Legislature passed 
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Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 (1994) to make clear that its purpose 
in requiring license suspensions for apparent violations of 
section 41-6-44 was not to exact a punishment from the driver, 
but rather to protect public safety: 
The Legislature finds that a primary 
purpose of this title relating to suspension 
or revocation of a person's license or 
privilege to drive a motor vehicle for 
driving with a blood alcohol content above a 
certain level or while under the influence of 
alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
alcohol and any drug, or for refusing to take 
a chemical test as provided in Section 41-6-
44.10, is protecting persons on the highways 
by quickly removing from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety 
hazards.4 
That the Legislature's intent in requiring suspensions 
a person's driving privileges for violations of section 41-6-44 
was to protect the public safety is bolstered by the fact that 
the Legislature prohibited the Division of Driver's Licenses from 
reinstating the suspended license following a driver's DUI 
4
 Defendants make much of the phrase lfa primary purpose" 
and suggest that the legislature implicitly acknowledged that it 
had other "primary purposes" for permitting administrative 
license revocations. Although defendants indicate that their 
review of the legislative history of section 53-3-222 revealed no 
insight into what those other purposes may have been, they 
proceed as though the legislative history indicates that the 
legislature had punitive purposes in mind. While that may be 
true with respect to individual legislators, the fact remains 
that only one purpose -- the desire to protect the public from 
unsafe drivers -- garnered enough support to merit codification. 
Moreover, during the 1995 legislative term, the 
legislature amended section 53-3-222 to make clear that the sole 
purpose of administrative license suspensions for driving while 
under the influence of alcohol was to promote swift action in the 
interest of protecting the public safety. Specifically, the 
legislature substituted the words "the purpose" for its earlier 
language of Ma primary purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-222 
(Supp. 1995). 
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conviction until the driver completes statutorily prescribed 
alcohol and drug dependency assessments, education, treatment and 
rehabilitation. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(8) (b) (i) (1994) . 
Indeed, the Legislature has even prohibited license reinstatement 
for drivers convicted of three violations within a six year 
period unless a licensed alcohol or drug dependency facility 
certifies that they no longer use alcohol or drugs in an abusive 
or illegal manner. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(8)(b)(iii) 
(1994). If deterrence and retribution were the Legislature's 
only purpose for requiring suspension of driving privileges for 
violations of section 41-6-44, it would not have enacted such 
elaborate safeguards to ensure that those privileges were not 
reinstated until after convicted DUI offenders had taken 
significant steps to show that they were no longer a threat to 
the public safety. 
Even before the enactment of section 53-3-222, the Utah 
Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of suspending a 
person's driving privileges for violations of section 41-6-44 was 
protection of public safety: 
The purpose of this administrative 
[license revocation] procedure is not to 
punish the inebriated drivers; such persons 
are subject to separate criminal prosecution 
for the purpose of punishment. The 
administrative revocation proceedings are to 
protect the public, not to punish individual 
drivers. 
Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1305. Accord Citv of Orem v. Crandall. 760 
P.2d 920, 922 (Utah App. 1988) (post-Halper case rejecting claim 
that administrative license suspension hearing was a criminal 
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proceeding that barred subsequent criminal prosecution for DUI). 
See also Barnes v. Tofanv. 261 N.E.2d 617, 620 (N.Y. Ct. App. 
1970) ("the suspension or revocation of the privilege of 
operating a motor vehicle is essentially civil in nature, having 
as its aims chastening of the errant motorist, and, more 
importantly, the protection of the public from such a dangerous 
individual"); People v. Esposito, 521 N.E.2d 873, 879-82 (111. 
1988); Ruae v. Kovach, 467 N.E.2d 673, 678-81 (Ind. 1984); Heddan 
v. Dirkswaaer, 336 N.W.2d 54, 59-63 (Minn. 1983) (all holding 
that due process is not offended by summary suspension of 
driver's license because state has important interest in keeping 
its highways safe by removing drunken drivers from its roads). 
Defendants suggest that Ballard is no longer valid 
because ffalper eliminated the distinction between civil and 
criminal proceedings for double jeopardy purposes. That argument 
is flawed for two reasons. First, the Court in Halper did not 
eliminate that distinction; the Court merely held, as it had 
implied in its earlier cases, that the distinction was not 
"paramount" because civil penalties that are not "rationally 
related to the goal of making the Government whole" can become 
punitive. Halper, 490 U.S. at 447, 451. More importantly, 
Ballard satisfies the Halper criteria. Specifically, the Ballard 
Court found that the purpose of license revocations is to protect 
the public safety and not to punish the driver. Nothing in 
Halper, Kurth Ranch or even Austin calls for a reconsideration of 
that finding. Until the Utah Supreme Court overturns Ballard, 
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all lower courts in Utah are bound by the Ballard Court's 
determination that the purpose of administrative drivers' license 
revocations for DUI and related offenses is to protect the public 
safety. See generally State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393, 398-99 
(Utah 1994) (discussing importance of stare decisis and heavy 
burden that must be met before overturning precedent). 
Accordingly, this Court need look no further than Ballard to 
affirm the trial court's denial of defendants' motions to 
dismiss. 
Even if this Court were inclined to revisit the issue 
of whether administrative license suspensions constitute 
punishment for double jeopardy purposes, it should follow the 
majority and better reasoned view and hold that they do not. 
In the years between Halper and Kurth Ranch every 
appellate court that addressed double jeopardy issues akin to 
that raised by defendants rejected those arguments. See, e.g., 
State v. Murray, 644 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1994) 
("Because the primary purpose of [suspending a driver's license 
for DUI] is to provide an administrative remedy for public 
protection, and not to punish the offender, a double jeopardy 
prohibition does not arise."); Johnson v. State. 622 A.2d 199, 
204-06 (Md.App. 1993) (purpose of suspension is to protect public 
safety and deter drunk driver; punitive effect was incidental and 
did not elevate suspension to level of punishment required under 
Halper); Butler v. Deot. of Public Safety & Corrections. 609 
So.2d 790, 795-97 (La. 1992) (while license suspension statute 
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"is to some extent deterrent and thus of a punitive nature . . . 
[its] primary effect is remedial; it removes those drivers from 
our state highways who have proven to be reckless or hazardous . 
. . [and therefore does not] amount to a second punishment for 
the same offense11); Vermont v. Strong, 605 A.2d 510, 513 (Vt. 
1992) (summary license suspension is not punishment under Halper 
because it "serves the rational remedial purpose of protecting 
public safety by quickly removing potentially dangerous drivers 
from the roads"); State v. Nichols, 819 P.2d 995, 1000 (Ariz. 
App. 1991) (while license suspension "may be punitive from the 
viewpoint of the license holder . . . its purpose is to remove 
from our highway drivers who are a danger to the public"). 
The double jeopardy analysis provided by the Vermont 
Supreme Court in Strong is typical of the cases cited above. In 
Strong, the court explained the purpose of its license suspension 
statute: 
The summary suspension scheme serves the 
rational remedial purpose of protecting 
public safety by quickly removing potentially 
dangerous drivers from the roads. License 
reinstatement requirements reinforce this 
purpose. Suspended licenses are reinstated 
only after operators have met screening and 
treatment requirements designed to identify 
unsafe drivers and to help them to the point 
where they no longer pose the same risk. The 
minimum suspension period is not excessive in 
relation to the remedial purpose, and we must 
defer to the Legislature in determining the 
remedial action necessary to achieve its 
goals. 
Strong, 605 A.2d at 513 (citations omitted). 
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Having identified the remedial purpose of the Vermont 
suspension scheme, the Strong Court acknowledged and then 
rejected the defendant's claim that Halper had fundamentally 
altered double jeopardy analysis: 
Our reading of Halper is more narrow 
than that of defendant. The Halper Court 
pointed out that its holding that a 
particular civil penalty was punitive "is a 
rule for the rare case." [490 U.S.] at 449, 
109 S.Ct. at 1902. The rule requires finding 
that the civil sanction may fairly be 
characterized "only as a deterrent or 
retribution." Id. (emphasis added). [T]he 
fact that a statute designed primarily to 
serve remedial purposes incidently serves the 
purpose of punishment as well does not mean 
that the statute results in punishment for 
double jeopardy purposes. 
Strong, 605 A.2d at 514 (some quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
Finally, the Strong Court emphasized that other courts 
had uniformly rejected similar double jeopardy claims: 
We note that no court has held that the 
suspension of a motor vehicle operator's 
license is so punitive as to involve a 
criminal punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes. The decisions prior to Halper held 
that license suspension is not a criminal 
punishment invoking double jeopardy 
protection. The few decisions since Halper 
hold similarly. In short, a "bright line" 
has developed because the nonpunitive purpose 
of the license suspension is so clear and 
compelling. We see nothing in Halper that 
induces us to cross that line. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Strong could well have been written in response to 
defendant's motion in this case. As discussed above, Utah's 
license suspension scheme, like Vermont's, is driven by the 
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desire to protect public safety and includes elaborate safeguards 
to ensure that driving privileges are not reinstated until the 
offender no longer poses a risk to society. While individual 
driver's may feel the "sting of punishment" when their driving 
privileges are revoked, that sting is merely incidental to the 
advancement of compelling public safety considerations. 
Accordingly, under Halper, driver's license suspensions and 
revocations cannot be deemed punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes because "administrative revocation proceedings are 
[designed] to protect the public, not to punish individual 
drivers." Ballard, 595 P.2d at 1305. 
In the year since Kurth Ranch was decided, DUI 
defendants across the country have, with renewed vigor, argued 
that their criminal prosecutions were barred because they had 
already been punished by having their driver's licenses revoked 
in administrative hearings. As defendants properly note, those 
arguments met with occasional success in trial courts. Br. of 
Appellants at 10-11. Defendants fail to acknowledge, however, 
that such claims have been almost universally rejected by 
appellate courts -- even in light of Austin and Kurth Ranch. 
See, e.g., State v. Savard & Greelev. 659 A.2d 1265, 1266-68 (Me. 
1995); State v. Young. 530 N.W.2d 269, 277-78 (Neb. App. 1995); 
State v. Murray. 644 So.2d 533, 535 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 1994); 
Hanson. 532 N.W.2d 598, 600-02; Higa. 897 P.2d at 932-934 (all 
post-Kurth Ranch cases holding that administrative driver's 
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license revocations are non-punitive remedial measures designed 
to protect the public safety).5 
This Court should follow the majority, and more 
thoughtfully reasoned view, and hold that an administrative 
license revocation does not constitute a criminal punishment 
under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, To do 
otherwise would be to adopt an interpretation of Halper that 
would have no bounds even though the Supreme Court made clear 
that its rule was one of reason that should result in civil 
sanctions being deemed punishments in only "rare" cases. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The State respectfully asks that this Court set this 
case for oral argument and render its decision in a published 
opinion. Given the vastly different interpretations of the 
central cases provided by the parties, the State believes oral 
argument will materially assist this Court in its deliberations. 
Motions to dismiss based on double jeopardy claims 
similar to those advanced by defendants have become virtually a 
matter of routine in DUI cases throughout Utah. Further 
proceedings in literally dozens of cases throughout the state 
5
 Only one panel of the Ohio Court of Appeals has held that 
administrative license revocations for driving while under the 
influence of alcohol constitutes a punishment for double jeopardy 
purposes- See State v. Gustafson. 1995 WL 387619 (Ohio App. 7th 
Dist.). However, another panel of the Ohio Court of Appeals has 
rejected that claim, State v. Miller. 1995 WL 275770 (Ohio App. 
3d Dist.), as have other lower courts in Ohio, State v. 
Ackrouche, 650 N.E.2d 535, 537-39 (Ohio Mun. 1995); Citv of 
Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.E.2d 1209, 1210-12 (Ohio Mun. 1995). 
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have been stayed pending resolution of these appeals. Issuance 
of a published opinion is therefore desirable because this is a 
case of first impression in Utah that will have widespread 
application. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's denials of defendants' motions to 
dismiss and remand the cases for trial. 
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